Judge rules against Port Authority

Judge Douglas Harkin has ruled against a motion filed by the Lincoln County Port Authority to separate oral arguments regarding ownership of the disputed cranes from other facets of the suit against Stinger Welding.

In his order, Harkin referenced an earlier order issued by the previous judge, who dissolved the port’s temporary restraining order against Stinger. In his ruling, Judge James Manley declared the port was unlikely to be successful in its case. Harkin reiterated Manley’s prediction.

“Separate oral arguments are unncessary if common arguments are used for similar or related motions,” Harkin wrote. “The bond posted is significant and most likely to be sufficient to cover the value of the cranes if the port is ultimately successful. Judge Manley’s order, albeit without the benefit of what has occurred since the order, is a telling prediction of the merits of the port’s argument for ownership of the cranes. Without crane ownership or some right to possession, lost opportunity costs are not likely to be recoverable.”

The motion was filed by Lincoln County Port Authority’s counsel Richard Allan Payne Nov. 10. In the motion, Payne claimed Stinger’s use of the cranes could result in diminished value. That potential loss, Payne asserted, justified the separation of the arguments and moving the disposition of the crane ownership question ahead of other motions in the case.

“The reason for this request, that of setting oral argument on these motions ahead of other motions for summary judgment pending in this matter, is simple: the port is informed that Stinger has taken the cranes from their outside storage and installed them in a new building, where Stinger is presumably using them, and could be causing them to further lose value,” Payne wrote.

Stinger, though counsel David Cotner, objected to the separation of arguments in the case. Cotner asserted the issue was moot, as Judge Manley had previously awarded Stinger possession and use of the cranes and because Stinger had posted a $1.4 million bond, which eliminated “any serious question of irreparable harm.”

The referenced order, issued by Judge Manley Dec. 13, 2013, dissolved the temporary restraining order granted to the port authority and ordered the port to allow Stinger to remove the cranes in an orderly and peaceful manner.

Judge Manley, in his order, accused the port of abusing the legal process for tactical reasons.

“Four days later, plaintiff filed this nearly identical suit, but added a claim of ownership of the cranes by plaintiff,” he wrote. “When asked why plaintiff did not move to amend the pleadings, in Judge Tucker’s case, to include the new claim of ownership, plaintiff’s counsel indicated this new case was filed because it was more expedient, and took less time than amending the claim in the other case would have taken. Of course, it is obvious that by filing this new case, plaintiff was able to get a temporary restraining order and seek preliminary injunction, which had just been dissolved and denied by Judge Tucker...The conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff has little or no chance of prevailing on its new claims of trespass or ownership of the cranes, and that this action is motivated by a desire to keep possession of Stinger’s cranes for tactical reasons.”

Manley not only ruled in favor of Stinger, but also excoriated Payne for his abuse of judicial process.

“Plaintiff does not prevail under MCA 27-19-201(3),” he wrote. “Defendants are not doing or threatening to do any act in violation of plaintiff rights tending to render judgment ineffectual. Defendants are not threatening to do anything. Defendants are trying to follow the law to get possession back of Stinger’s property. Defendants have been admirably patient and lawful, in light of the suprisingly cynical misuse of judicial process in this case.”

Based upon the arguments presented in the motions and responses, and upon Judge Manley’s previous order, Judge Harkin ruled there is no need to separate the arguments.

“There does not appear to the court that there is any significant value in attempting to resolve crane ownership separate from related dispositive motions,” he ruled.